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Abstract 
Across most contemporary democracies, different provisions of public funding for parties 
have been introduced in post-war times. Parties have come to rely heavily on this subsidy, 
yet, the effects of this change in party finance remains poorly understood. Sweden is no 
exception to this rule, where parties receive considerable amounts of funding from both state 
and local authorities. In this thesis, I utilize rich panel data on Swedish municipalities 
between 1998 and 2014 to study the effects of different levels of municipal party funding on 
two forms of political participation: Turnout in municipal elections, and membership in the 
Green Party. I apply time and unit fixed effects and a vector of control variables in regression 
models. Overall, estimated coefficients are negative for simpler specifications regarding 
turnout, and otherwise statistically inseparable from zero. This suggests that municipal party 
support does not live up to its express goal of strengthening local democracy, at least not in 
terms of increasing political participation, but might not necessarily be detrimental to it 
either. 
Keywords: Political finance; Political participation; Local democracy; Swedish 
municipalities  
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1. Introduction 
In his seminal work, Schattschneider (1942, p. 1) asserted that “modern democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of political parties”. This statement is no less true today than it was 
then, and unsurprisingly, political parties have been a central object of study for social 
scientists of many strains. Parties have remained of fundamental importance due to their 
function as the vehicle for the popular will to be mediated and resolved into government 
policy. Naturally, virtually all aspects of parties themselves, and how they relate to other 
societal entities have been studied extensively. The aim of this thesis is to further shed light 
on one aspect of parties that has not received considerable scholarly attention, due to both its 
rather recent introduction, but also due to the limited availability of comparable data – the 
public funding of parties, and in this case its eventual effect on political participation. I will 
utilize data for municipal public funding of parties in Sweden to examine the link between 
public funding of parties on the one hand, and electoral participation and party membership 
respectively on the other hand. 
The history of assembling in groups to assert political power is arguably as indefinably old as 
society itself. The specific organizational form of the political party, however, is more 
particular in its historical emergence and is usually attributed to the British rise of Whigs and 
Tories in the late 17
th
 century (Duverger, 2014). A brief history of modern parties in western 
democracies is conventionally put in terms of the evolution from elite parties, to mass parties, 
to catch-all parties, and subsequently in post-industrial times to cartel parties (e.g. Katz & 
Mair, 1995). This description inherently focuses on the relation between parties, the state and 
civil society, which makes it particularly useful as a theoretical backdrop for this study. The 
development of mass parties coincided with extensions of the political franchise, and 
conflicts of the concurrent time remain inscribed in these parties (e.g. Social Democratic 
movements as the political faction of trade unions, and their counterparts). From this, the 
catch-all party developed in post-war times, where the social cohesion of party bases were 
less pronounced – this type of parties served (or rather, serves) the role of “competing brokers 
between civil society and state” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p.  18). However, in recent times (from 
the 70’s), a new model of parties has emerged – the cartel party – which is more a part of the 
state than of civil society. To ascertain the validity of this narrative, and if so explain its 
emergence, the funding of parties of course becomes a central issue. It is undeniably true that 
public funding of parties has grown exponentially in recent history, from being virtually non-
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existent in pre-war times, when nowadays more than 75 % of liberal democracies provide 
direct public funding to political parties (van Biezen & Kopecky, 2007, p. 245). To what 
extent parties rely on this public funding in comparison to other sources is notoriously hard to 
examine due to data limitations – since the design of public funding of parties is so diverse 
across countries, no comparative cross-country data for party funding exists. Thus, I will 
utilize the cross-municipal variation that exists in Sweden, where records of municipal 
funding are reported for the period 1998 and onwards (SKL, 2017a). 
Municipal party support was introduced in Sweden in 1969, when municipalities gained the 
legal possibility to give economic support to parties, based on their representation in the 
elected municipal council (SFS 1969:596). After its introduction, all municipalities adopted 
municipal party funding. The municipal party support is quite extensive, and is about on par 
with the state’s party funding in Sweden. The development over time over the period of 
interest for this study is shown in Figure 1, where it is clear that party support has increased 
(but not monotonically) over time, and that it tends to be somewhat higher in election years. 
 
Figure 1. Municipal party support, 1998-2014, measured in million SEK in 1998 prices. 
Sources: SKL 2017a, author’s calculations. 
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1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether public funding of parties has an effect on 
political participation. Ways and means to answer this question are highly elusive, which is 
presumably the cause to why few studies have been produced on the topic. My attempt at this 
utilizes the richness of Swedish data, on municipal party support (SKL, 2017a) and turnout in 
municipal elections (SCB, 2017). In addition to that, I have reached out to the political parties 
in Sweden represented in the Riksdag for data on party membership on the municipal level. 
Only the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) have been kind enough to provide me with this. The 
temporal limits of this study are from 1998 when it comes to party funding, and from 2001 
when it comes to party membership, to 2014, since this is currently when the last general 
election was held. The data on electoral turnout is naturally complete, and I use municipal 
elections as outcome, since this is where effects of local party funding is likely to be most 
pronounced if in any election. This choice probably has limited implications, since in 
Sweden, elections to all levels take place simultaneously, and thus most voters vote either on 
all or none of the levels one is eligible to vote on. When it comes to the data on party 
membership, I would ideally have had data for all Swedish parties. Having only one case, 
with a relatively small party, conclusions from these estimates have to be considered highly 
tentative when it comes to extrapolating to the question that I initially wanted to answer, 
regarding party membership in general. Thus, throughout this thesis, party membership is 
secondary in order as an outcome, and the principal results concerns the more robust data on 
electoral turnout in municipal elections. However, a scientific contribution remains when it 
comes to estimating the effects of public funding on Green Party membership, since this is 
decidedly unexplored terrain of considerable theoretical interest. 
Is there reason to expect a relationship between public funding of political parties and 
political participation? I will naturally go into this question further later in this thesis, but a 
short answer is needed to motivate this study. Empirical evidence is, as stated, scarce, but 
theoretically, one could clearly make a case for public funding to affect different kinds of 
political participation in different ways. The motivation for having municipal public funding 
is to “strengthen the political parties in opinion formation and through that local democracy” 
(Prop. 1991/92:66). Since municipal public support accounted for more than 84 % of the 
revenue for local party organizations in 2007 (Konstitutionsutskottet, quoted in TT, 2009), it 
is safe to assume that this support not only provides means for communication, but for all 
party activities. Thus, if parties spend more on mobilization the more resources they have, 
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and mobilization efforts of parties have a positive effect on turnout, which I deem likely, 
higher party income should lead to higher turnout. When it comes to party membership on the 
other hand, there are probably theoretical reasons to expect that higher provisions of public 
funding to parties lead to lower membership, given that parties want to maximize their 
influence through acquiring votes. Thus, parties don’t “need” members in any greater extent 
than they are useful for providing resources for getting votes – through members’ own votes, 
their effect on their networks, and their financial contributions through membership fees. If 
parties previously relied more heavily on membership fees to finance their activities, the shift 
to financing their activities through public funding (provided, in a sense, by themselves) 
should lead to members becoming of lesser importance to them. Thus, it is likely that the 
evolution of public funding of parties (the Cartel Party, cf. Katz & Mair, 1995) has led to a 
decrease in party membership. What is harder to ascertain, however, is if shifts in levels from 
year to year in public funding affects the “need” for members for parties. Arguably, parties 
will put more effort into curbing members in years when public provision of funds is low. 
All in all, the hypothesized relationships presented here rests on fragile assumptions at best. 
The strength of this study is also its weakness – the field of study of the effects of public 
funding of parties on political participation is limited, and not explored at all previously on 
the municipal level in Sweden. Hopefully, this thesis can provide highly tentative results that 
can be a first shard of insight into this particular area of research. 
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2. Theory, Previous Research & Empirics 
In this part, I will provide brief accounts of previous research on the topic of public party 
finance, theory about parties and public party finance, and empirical details of the case at 
hand, to present the context of the analysis. First, I would like to make a short note on the 
level of analysis this thesis uses, and what units that are of interest, since the sources 
discussed in this chapter considers quite different units – from individuals, to parties, 
municipalities and countries. The variables central to the analysis in some regard reside on 
different levels. Political participation, i.e. turnout and membership, is an individual action, 
whereas party funding is decided upon by politicians and affects parties, both on the 
municipal and state level. However, the unit of analysis in this thesis is municipalities, where 
the individual variables are taken in the aggregate. Thus, the question with this explicit unit 
of analysis can be formulated as: Will the level of municipal provision of funding for 
municipal party organizations affect municipal political participation? It can be of importance 
to keep this in mind throughout this section. 
2.1 Previous Research 
The question whether the research field of political finance is satisfactorily explored is a 
contested one. According to Fisher & Eisenstadt (2004, p. 619), “the study of party finance is 
underdeveloped”, but on the other hand, Ohman (2011, p.1) states that “political finance is no 
longer an understudied aspect”.  The reason for Ohman’s claim is not only the research that 
has been carried out in the meantime between the publishing of the two works, but also that 
he considers several studies that are not comparative in the sense that they use actual, 
comparable quantities. For the purpose of this thesis, the previous research that is of greater 
interest is the one considering comparative political finance in a stricter meaning, which 
arguably Fisher & Eisenstadt’s claim still holds true for. I will very briefly describe this 
research field (for an overview, see e.g. Scarrow, 2007), since it relates to my research 
question only marginally, due to the focus on the cross-national level. When it comes to the 
particular units studied in this thesis, one article has used the same indicators of municipal 
party support (in that case as an outcome), namely Svaleryd & Vlachos (2009), which I will 
discuss shortly as well. 
The ambition to study political finance comparatively has been carried out mostly at the 
international level, which there are appropriate reasons for – with the introduction of far-
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reaching public financing of parties across most democracies in post-war times, research is 
not only due but should also be fairly straightforward, given that these measurements have 
been introduced at different times in different countries (e.g. IDEA, 2014). However, this 
research project has been plagued by the lack of appropriate data for cross-country 
comparisons. One source that is promising, but too limited in time for purposes of studying 
the (eventual) contemporary development of cartelization of parties is Katz & Mair (1992), 
which is used by e.g. Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt (2000). Another source, that is more widely 
used contemporarily, is IDEA’s (2012) Political Finance Database (available in earlier 
editions as well), used by e.g. Ohman (2011), Pinto-Duschinsky (2002), and researchers at 
IDEA (2014). However commendable the attempt to establish a database over comparative 
political finance is, IDEA’s attempt is lacking for purposes of studies of effects from different 
levels of public party support. Since public provisions of funding for parties come in so many 
different forms, and in such different magnitude, the database provided by IDEA (2012) only 
uses binary indicators for whether or not particular types of provisions are in place. This 
renders the database useful for some studies, but not for ones trying to estimate marginal 
effects of public party funding, e.g. on political participation. 
The turn towards party finance can naturally firstly be explained by the empirical pattern of 
the introduction of extensive public provisions of funding for parties, but also linked to the 
influential theoretical account of Katz & Mair (1995, 2009). The idea of the cartel party is all 
but evident from the name, and in short consists of parties becoming part of the state rather 
than of civil society – it is a process of “cartelization”, which means that parties “increasingly 
function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and 
ensure their own electoral success” (Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 753). This is more of a theoretical 
proposition than an empirical pattern, but it has interesting implications for the study at hand 
here. Municipal party support in Sweden is subject to very limited auditing, and parties in 
power can practically choose whatever level they want to put their own funding from the 
municipality on. This is what leads Svaleryd & Vlachos (2009) to study municipal party 
support as a form of political rent. The conceptualization of municipal party support as a 
political rent can be discussed, since governing parties cannot decide on any distribution rules 
that disproportionally favor themselves, at least formally, and additionally, “after all, it is 
possible that voters have a preference for public sponsoring of political parties” (p. 365). 
However, one point that reinforces Svaleryd & Vlachos case is that on municipal levels, 
scrutiny is comparatively low, and political rent extraction is thus much more plausible than 
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e.g. on the national level. Ultimately, the authors find evidence for higher rent extraction (i.e. 
municipal party support) in municipalities with lower levels of political competition and local 
media coverage. In this thesis, I will not conceptualize municipal party support as political 
rent extraction, but rather take it at face value, which is sensible when used as an independent 
variable – the eventual effect of this variable on political participation is the same, regardless 
of the “nature” of this support. 
When it comes to linking political participation to public party support, little empirical work 
has been done due to the data limitations mentioned above. There are some notable 
exceptions to this rule, such as e.g. Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt (2000) regarding party 
membership. Their work does not provide any estimations of effects, however, but rather 
observes whether or not certain developments coincide in time. Thus, this relationship 
remains an open question empirically. Furthermore, the outcome in this thesis, the concept of 
political participation is somewhat elusive. One “loose” definition is provided by van Deth 
(2016), as “citizens’ activities affecting politics”. Regardless of exact definition, the principal 
form of participation in modern democracies for most citizens is electoral participation, 
which stands at the center of representative democracy itself. Therefore, it is a natural 
measurement in this thesis to use as an operationalization of political participation. In 
addition to this, I will use party membership as an outcome, since this is one of the most 
commonplace and significant forms of political participation, but also of distinctive 
theoretical interest in connection to public funding of parties.  
2.2 Theoretical Foundation 
Theoretically, parties are often described in the terms put forth by Downs (1957) in his 
seminal work An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, which is loosely 
based upon an observation by Hotelling (1929, pp. 54f), that parties tend to converge policy-
wise in two-party systems. Downs provides a theoretical explanation for why this is the case, 
given certain assumptions (p. 143), but also builds a more general model of rational political 
action for parties and voters. Parts of this work is too abstract to use in the setting of a thesis 
like this, but one of the main takeaways that I think is important to emphasize is that parties 
can be seen as vote-maximizers, or in Down’s (p. 137) words: “political parties in a 
democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining voters.” A noteworthy conclusion 
that follows from this is that the decision on what level to put municipal support upon is 
endogenous to the outcome of attaining votes. However, for the purposes of this section, the 
main theoretical assumption of interest is that parties are rational actors who try to maximize 
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their power, which in this setting means to maximize vote share. Thus, when parties have the 
capacity to decide on their own levels of public funding, they do so to maximize votes for 
themselves as well. What is the expected result from this? One consequence is that parties are 
likely to jointly “cartelize” to at least keep outside competition scarce, over-financing 
themselves and creating considerable hurdles for market entry, i.e. an insider-outsider 
situation (e.g. Lindbeck & Snower, 1984). Furthermore, going to somewhat less abstract 
terms than Downs, parties are presumably likely to not be too interested in curbing members, 
as they would be when members not only provided the benefits of being enthusiastic 
campaigners etc., but also provided a greater share of total party revenue in membership fees. 
In somewhat crude terms, parties need money to sustain their existence, and votes to gain 
power – when they gain the ability to solve the first part themselves; members are likely to 
become of lesser interest to parties. 
Furthermore, there is a debate about whether or not governments should provide public 
funding for parties, and the arguments against this have been brought up in this section 
already. Public party support can be seen as evidence of “the successful co-optation of the 
state” by parties (Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt, 2000, p. 2), it can disrupt competition in the 
party system, and it can “virtually abolish the parties’ interests in sustaining or increasing 
their membership” (p.3), thus harming democracy through reducing political participation. 
However, there are theoretical reasons why states should provide public funding for parties, 
as well. Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt (2000, pp. 4ff) provides an account of three reasons why 
states should “subsidize” parties: First, parties should be compensated for the indispensable 
role they play in the democratic process (getting out the vote etc.), second, state support to 
parties make individual contributions of money less important, evening out political influence 
among the populace, and third, it ensures that parties have a stronger possibility to be 
independent from wealthy interest organizations of different kinds. Both the second and third 
argument have to do with political equality, and arguably have considerable merit. 
Ultimately, most of these arguments hinge upon assumptions about party and voter behavior 
that can be empirically tested. 
Finally in this section, I will briefly discuss theoretical reasons to expect a relationship to 
exist between public funding and political participation, and the signage of this. The idea with 
municipal party support is to strengthen local democracy, and one consequence of this should 
ideally be that political participation, both in terms of turnout and (local) party membership, 
is increased (Prop. 1991/92:66). However, I expect that this might not be the case. Rather, as 
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described by Svaleryd & Vlachos (2009), municipal party funding could be conceptualized as 
the extent to which rents are extracted to parties, which are likely to crowd out the need for 
members for parties given that there is substitutability to some extent between different 
resources. It becomes clear that one has to differentiate between different forms of political 
participation when describing their theoretical linkage to public support to parties, since 
membership is, to reiterate, likely to be negatively affected by higher party support, while the 
expected effect on turnout is more ambiguous. Holding everything else constant, an increase 
in municipal party support would presumably lead to higher electoral turnout, assuming that 
parties’ expenditure on getting out the vote (GOTV) efforts are monotonically increasing in 
party income, and that parties are at least so effective at curbing voters that their efforts yield 
marginally positive results. However, everything else is never constant in reality, and higher 
municipal support might very well have general equilibrium effects that are hard to predict – 
the subsequent change in membership structure that presumably follows might result in 
changes in voting patterns that are not only nigh impossible to theoretically predict, but also 
hard for parties to ascertain. Naturally, the relationships between these factors are highly 
complex and interdependent. There are many theoretical hurdles that persist, regarding e.g. 
simultaneity and spuriosities. In conclusion, some of these hurdles can arguably be overcome 
by methodological efforts, and some simply prevail barring experimental or quasi-
experimental techniques, which is unfortunately not feasible in this setting. Nonetheless, the 
motivation for carrying out this study is that these hurdles shouldn’t imply that the topic 
shouldn’t be studied – just that results have to be interpreted very cautiously, since we know 
very little about both theoretical and empirical aspects of the relationship between public 
funding of parties and political participation. 
2.3 Empirical Aspects 
Before going into the methodological details, I will present the empirics that are the basis of 
this thesis specifically, namely municipal party support, electoral participation in municipal 
elections and membership in the Green Party, all of this for Sweden 1998-2014. 
2.3.1 Municipal Party Support 
In 1969, Sweden introduced the legal prerequisites for municipalities to give support to local 
parties, in addition to the state party support that was introduced in 1965 (SOU 2012:30, 
314). Reviews of both legislation and practice occurred a few times during the 70’s and 80’s, 
and significant change of the system occurred in 1991 with the new municipal law 
(Kommunallagen SFS 1991:900, SOU 1991:80). From the outset, municipal party support 
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has been regulated so that it only can be distributed according to some objective measures 
such as vote share or share of representatives in the municipal council, and from 1991 the law 
reads: “the support must not be designed in such manner that it unduly favors or disfavors a 
certain party” (SFS 1991:900). Hagevi (2014) provides an exposé over Swedish party support 
both on the municipal and state level. For the purposes of this thesis, the minute details of 
how municipal party support has been regulated are not of particular interest. The empirical 
pattern of how municipal party support has developed over the time period of interest is 
shown in figure 1, and on average across municipalities in figure 4. Clear patterns are 
somewhat hard to discern, but it seems like municipal party support has increased since the 
electoral year 2006, and that party support tends to be somewhat higher during election years. 
This of course obscures a high degree of variation across municipalities, where rural 
municipalities in the north seem to have slightly higher levels of municipal party support, 
even though this pattern is hardly clear-cut. 
 
2.3.2 Turnout and Party Membership 
Electoral turnout in Swedish general elections is among the very highest of democracies 
without compulsory voting laws (Öhrvall, 2012), and the pattern of turnout over time in 
municipal elections in the time period of interest is shown in figure 3, and across 
Figure 2. Turnout in municipal elections, 1998-2014. Source: SCB, 2017. 
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municipalities on average this period in figure 5. Municipal elections occur on the same time, 
and through the same procedure, as elections to the parliament (Riksdagen) and the regional 
councils. Turnout in municipal elections are about 2-3 percentage points lower in municipal 
elections than in parliamentary elections, an effect that is partly due to a greater share of 
unconcerned individuals being eligible to vote in municipal elections. Looking at the pattern 
across municipalities in figure 5, more urban municipalities seem to have higher electoral 
turnout, generally, which is a known empirical pattern in Sweden usually considered to be the 
result of better socio-economic prerequisites (Öhrvall, 2012).  
 
 
When it comes to membership in the Green Party, the development over the time period 
considered in this thesis is quite impressive – going from a membership base in 2001 of about 
7 000 members to just above 20 000 members in 2014. One pattern that is evident from figure 
3 is that the Green Party tends to have a significantly higher number of members in election 
years, which is an unsurprising result, considering that individuals both tend to be more 
politically active in an election year in general, but also that GOTV campaigns are likely to 
include offers of becoming a member in the party.  
Figure 3. Membership in the Green Party, aggregated to the national level, 2001-2014. 
Source: Miljöpartiet, 2017. 
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Figures 4 & 5. Average municipal party support per inhabitant and year in 1998 prices, 1998-2014, and 
average electoral turnout in municipal elections, by municipality Sources: SKL, 2017a, SCB, 2017. 
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3. Method, Data & Models 
3.1 Methodology
1
 
The main problem facing social scientists who want to study the effect of public funding of 
parties on political participation is the inherent endogeneity of the variables at hand. It is 
reasonable to expect that there are many aspects that determine both the level of public party 
support, and political participation, in a municipality. To take an example, one wider aspect 
that comes to mind is economic prerequisites for a municipality, where those with inhabitants 
with less economic-political resources will need higher public support for parties to sustain 
them economically, but still reaches lower levels of participation, thus introducing bias into a 
crude estimation of this relationship. Some of these aspects might be somewhat easy to nail 
down as observable variables, such as e.g. income and educational level of the population, 
and thus renders no problems in themselves. What is more problematic, on the other hand, is 
both getting the models right in the sense that one controls for the variables causing the bias, 
and only them, and all the unobservable characteristics that might bias the estimates. 
Nonetheless, there are probably good reasons to believe that there is a “true” relationship 
between municipal funding of parties and local political participation, as stated above – the 
hurdle that needs to be overcome is how to estimate it. 
The ambition to draw causal conclusions is not an unusual one in economics, and the 
challenges to reaching that goal can be put in more general terms that remain valid for most 
studies using observational data, with the help of the Neyman-Rubin model of causal 
inference (Sekhon, 2008). With observational data, correlations are easily produced in terms 
of “when X happens, Y happens to a certain extent (in the sample)‖, but the aim is to reach 
causal claims that X causes Y, which proves much harder due to the so-called fundamental 
problem of causal inference. The severity of this problem can be illustrated with an example 
from Rubin (1974, p. 689). An individual has a headache, and is faced with the decision 
whether or not to take an analgesic. The individual can take the pill and be relieved from the 
pain, the individual can take the pill and not be relieved from the pain, the individual can 
choose not to take the pill but still be relieved from the pain, or lastly the individual can elect 
to not take the pill, and still have a headache. Naturally, only one of these things happens, and 
                                                 
1
 In this section, I draw upon work done in my master’s thesis in political science (Hultin Bäckersten, 2016). 
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the intuitive conclusions that flow from them respectively are quite different. If the individual 
decides to take the analgesic, and the pain remains, the conclusion is presumably that the pill 
didn’t work. However, if the individual had decided to not take the pill, the situation might 
very well have worsened, meaning that the pill would have had a positive effect on the 
experienced pain. The problem for the researcher is that we only observe one of these choices 
with associated outcomes for each individual, while causality is defined as the difference in 
outcomes for a single individual taking different lines of action (Rubin, 1974:689). The 
corollary to this thesis is that ideally, we would observe the same municipality both if it had 
decided on a higher level of party support, and on a lower level of party support – the causal 
effect of higher levels of party support is then simply the difference in outcomes. Since this is 
obviously not possible, strategies to attain causally interpretable estimates must be employed. 
To formalize this problem slightly, I will use notation from Angrist & Pischke (2008, pp. 
10ff), where the outcome for unit i is denoted YDi, and treatment status
2
 Di. What is observed 
for each individual unit is naturally the outcome when treated for the units assigned 
treatment, and the outcome when untreated for those not assigned treatment (see Table 1). 
The causal effect is defined as Y1i – Y0i, which is naturally never observed for any single unit. 
The most straightforward solution to this problem is to estimate the difference between 
observed outcomes, which gives the following expected result:  
 [   |    ]    [   |    ]. 
The problem with this estimation is easily seen by adding and subtracting the unobserved 
outcome for those in the “treatment group”, had they not been treated, and rearranging: 
  [   |    ]   [   |    ]⏟    
                                       
     [   |    ]    [   |    ]⏟    
              
 
 Y0i Y1i 
Di = 0 Actual Counterfactual 
Di = 1 Counterfactual Actual 
 
                                                 
2
 Treatment status is in this case considered to be binary, to facilitate a more straightforward presentation. It is 
however easily extended to cases where this is continuous, such as with municipal party funding. 
Table 1. Potential outcomes.  
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In the second equation above, the true causal effect (on the treated) and the bias introduced 
by (potential) differences between groups treated and untreated can be separated. The goal is, 
rather obviously, to eliminate the latter term, to attain causal estimates from regressions.
3
 The 
most straightforward way of getting rid of the selection bias term is to randomize treatment 
status among individual units, since random assignment guarantees that treatment status Di is 
independent of potential outcomes. Thus, the selection bias term disappears, and the equation 
above simplifies to  [       ] (Angrist & Pischke, 2008, p. 12). This, however impossible 
in the case of public funding of parties, is of significant theoretical interest to further 
understand other strategies to attain causal estimates. Ultimately, virtually all identification 
strategies to attain this relies on trying to come as close as possible to the ideal of 
randomization. 
The question that remains unanswered is how causally interpretable estimates can be reached 
in the specific setting for this thesis. The variables of interest in this study are observed and 
cannot be manipulated by the researcher, and they also are likely to be endogenous to one 
another. In terms of the selection bias from the equation above, municipalities with higher 
party support would probably not have had outcomes in terms of political participation equal 
to those of municipalities with lower party support, had they not have had higher party 
support. The strategy that is applicable in this case is to try to control for all factors that cause 
this selection bias, through regular addition of controls in an OLS setting and the use of fixed 
effects. The methodological concept that is central to both these strategies is the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA), which provides arguments for causal interpretations of 
estimates from regressions with a specific set of control variables, given that the CIA holds. 
In more formal terms, with Xi denoting a set of characteristics, the CIA can be expressed as  
    ∐    |   , which read out says that potential outcomes are independent of treatment 
status, conditional on characteristics Xi (Angrist & Pischke, 2008, pp. 44ff). This sounds 
familiar to the implications from random assignment of treatment status, which is just as it 
should be – given that one controls for the vector of characteristics Xi, treatment status can be 
considered as if it was randomized. Thus, the paramount task at hand is to control for the 
right characteristics to eliminate the selection bias. In this thesis, I will firstly use 
conventional control variables that presumably could be the ones (or good proxies for the 
                                                 
3
 I will not go into how linear regressions capture the same elements that are described with the Rubin causal 
framework, but an interested reader can find a straightforward explanation in Angrist & Pischke, 2008, pp. 16ff. 
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ones) that determine selection into different levels of municipal party support, namely 
different characteristics of the municipalities and their inhabitants. This is based on what is 
usually referred to as a “selection-on-observables” assumption, discussed originally by 
Barnow, Cain & Goldberger (1961). Furthermore, I will apply both time and unit fixed 
effects, respectively and combined, since the confounding variables (i.e. the observables that 
selection occurs on) are highly elusive. Applying fixed effects is equivalent to “de-meaning” 
a variable, and takes away all time-invariant variation in the case of unit fixed effects, and all 
unit-invariant variation in the case of year fixed effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2008, pp. 165ff). 
The identifying assumption is once again a form of conditional independence assumption, 
just that the characteristics Xit (given that we now move to the world with panel data) need 
not be observed, but need to be time-invariant, unit-invariant or both. Whether the strategies 
presented here are sufficient to control for the selection process, on observed and unobserved 
variables, is open for debate, since it is a question that cannot be finally answered 
empirically. I am in no way certain that these strategies, with the particular variables used in 
detail, is enough to overcome the fundamental problem of causal inference. However, it is 
presumably true that these strategies get much closer to estimating a causal effect than a 
“crude” estimate, i.e. from the simple bivariate regression model. 
3.2 Data 
Before going to the final step before results are presented, namely model specifications, the 
data used in this thesis will be presented briefly in this section. In this thesis, I utilize data 
coming from three sources: Statistics Sweden (SCB), the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SKL), and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet). As stated before, the 
main temporal limits of the analysis in this thesis comes from two variables, namely the 
independent variable of interest municipal party support, which is available from 1998- 
(SKL, 2017a), and one of the two dependent variables, party membership in the Green Party, 
which is available from 2001- (Miljöpartiet, 2017).  
The reliability of the data used in this thesis is presumably generally very high. The data on 
some variables, such as turnout, municipality characteristics and most demographic 
characteristics are likely to be all but impeccable. The measurement of municipal party 
support, however, is more questionable, since harmonization across municipalities is not in 
any way guaranteed. For example, the reporting of free provision of rooms for offices, 
meetings, etc. by the municipality to political parties as a subsidy is likely to vary greatly 
across municipalities. I see no reason to expect that this would introduce any systematic bias 
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to the data (especially in models where municipality fixed effects are applied), but it is likely 
to incur more noise and thus less precise estimates. Lastly, the reliability of the data on 
membership in the Green Party is by design nigh impossible to ascertain. Ultimately, I simply 
have to trust that the records kept by the Green Party centrally are valid enough to use as at 
least an approximation of the “true” numbers, which I find no good reason to doubt. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that I remove a few outliers that might distort estimations. 
Namely, Båstad held a reelection to their municipal council in 2014, severely lowering their 
electoral participation for this particular year, resulting in this observation affecting especially 
models with fixed effects disproportionally. The same goes for public party funding, for Åre 
municipality, which has all three values in the sample that are greater than 500 SEK per year 
per inhabitant (more than 40 standard deviations over the mean!), thus distorting the picture 
severely. To conclude this section, I present summary statistics of all variables used in this 
study (with the mentioned outliers, but naturally without municipality and year dummies) in 
table 2, together with measurements and sources to make results more readily interpretable 
for the reader. 
   
Variable Mean Min Max SD N Years Measurement Source 
Turnout, municipal elections 80.24 57.8 92 3.86 1447 1998- %*100 of eligible SCB, 2017 
Members in the Green Party 11.27 0 87.26 7.18 4018 2001- 
Members per 10,000 
inhabitants 
Miljöpartiet, 
2017 
Municipal party funding, same 
year 
37.69 0 842.88 25.73 4922 1998- 
SEK/inhabitant/year, 1998 
prices 
SKL, 2017a 
Municipal party funding, full term 148.19 22.61 1549.73 84.86 1157 2002- 
SEK/inhabitant/term, 1998 
prices 
SKL, 2017a 
Post-High School education 27.42 12.6 72.7 9.26 4346 2000- Share of inhabitants (*100) SKL, 2017a 
Pre-High School education 18.72 3.3 37.6 5.31 4346 2000- Share of inhabitants (*100) SKL, 2017a 
Foreign born 10.56 2.01 41.59 5.79 4922 1998- Share of inhabitants (*100) SCB, 2017 
Working age (15-74) 72.91 67.78 78.37 1.66 4922 1998- Share of inhabitants (*100) SCB, 2017 
Working 45.67 30.72 54.22 3.18 4922 1998- Share of inhabitants (*100) SCB, 2017 
Women 49.79 46.42 52.43 0.78 4922 1998- Share of inhabitants (*100) SCB, 2017 
Left-wing governing coalition 0.44 0 1 0.5 1446 1998- 
1 if left-wing government, 
0 otherwise 
SKL, 2017b 
Right-wing governing coalition 0.39 0 1 0.49 1446 1998- 
1 if right-wing government, 
0 otherwise 
SKL, 2017b 
Mixed governing coalition 0.17 0 1 0.38 1446 1998- 
1 if mixed government, 0 
otherwise 
SKL, 2017b 
Municipality type 5.69 1 10 2.48 4922 1998- 10 groups (see source) SKL, 2011 
Taxpaying power 121629.2 74094 267955.8 21231.07 4922 1998- 
Taxable income per 
inhabitant, 1998 prices 
SKL, 2017a 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the variables used in estimations. For sources, see table. 
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3.3 Models 
In this thesis, I will as previously stated estimate a number of regression equations on two 
separate outcomes, namely turnout in municipal elections and membership in the Green 
Party. For these two outcomes, I will estimate the same set of eight equations, and thus I will 
present the models with a generic outcome term denoted       
The model in its full form, where all estimated equations are nested, can be expressed with 
the following equation, in a quite simplified form: 
                           
Explanations for what these terms signify are due: The left-hand side is as stated the outcome, 
measured as percentage points for turnout and members per 10 000 inhabitants for party 
membership. The right-hand side consists of the intercept to be estimated, α, the coefficient to 
be estimated, β, the variable of interest xit, which is municipal party support for either the 
same year as an election or full term (4 years) preceding an election, measured as kr per 
inhabitant per year or term in 1998 prices,    is a vector of dummies for each municipality 
(except one) and associated coefficients,    is a vector of dummies for each election year 
(except one) and associated coefficients,     is a vector of control variables concerning both 
municipality characteristics and demography characteristics (see Table 2 for details and 
measurements) and     is the usual idiosyncratic error term. 
I will estimate eight different regression models for both outcomes that are nested in the 
equation above. In the first model, all parameters except α and β are constrained to be equal 
to zero – in other words, this is the simple bivariate regression model. In the second model, 
municipality fixed effects are applied, which in equation-terms means that    is no longer 
constrained to zero. In the third model, time fixed effects are applied, meaning that α, β and 
   are estimated. In the fourth model, time and unit fixed effects are applied. In the fifth 
model, demographic control variables (shares of inhabitants that are foreign born, women, 
working, of working age, have high school education only, and have a university degree 
respectively) are added to the model in addition to the variable of interest, public funding. In 
the sixth model, municipality characteristics controls (taxpaying power per capita, 
municipality type, and governing coalition) are applied. In the seventh model, both 
demographic and municipality characteristics control variables are applied. Finally, in the 
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eighth model, all control variables are applied in addition to time fixed effects, constraining 
only the vector of municipality dummies
4
   . In the results section, estimates of the intercept 
and the coefficient in focus here (α and β) are the only ones that will be reported to facilitate 
reading. 
The independent variable in all of these models is municipal party funding, measured in 
krona per inhabitant in 1998 prices, but all models will be estimated with this measured as 
support in the same year or for the full term preceding an election. It is naturally crucial to get 
the temporal aspect of this variable correct, and the reason why I choose to use both of these 
as explanatory variables separately is mostly as a robustness check. One could in addition 
consider estimating this variable with a lag, since party support in the previous time period 
might affect outcomes in terms of political participation in the current period. However, I 
think there are convincing reasons not to do this, especially given that in all but a few models, 
the only years of interest are election years. When it comes to the models where non-election 
years are used, the outcome of interest is party membership – an outcome that is likely to be 
affected to a much greater extent in the concurrent year, in comparison to the preceding year. 
Furthermore, given what we know about election campaigns, get out the vote-campaigns 
rarely if ever take place in the year preceding an election year in Sweden, which of course to 
a high extent is a particular feature of this particular political system (where general elections 
always occur in September). 
The interpretations of the models to be estimated in this thesis are somewhat different over 
different specifications. As stated before, crude estimates from model 1 are highly likely to be 
biased, i.e. the error term will be correlated with the variable of interest. Nonetheless, these 
estimates say something interesting about the relationship studied, even if not in a causal 
manner – it shows how the “raw” relationship between e.g. municipal party support and 
electoral turnout looks. Further, models where fixed effects are applied are somewhat harder 
to interpret. In somewhat crude terms, estimates from model 4 can be interpreted as how 
deviations from the mean level in respective municipalities and years of municipal funding 
affects (or is related to) deviations from the mean level in respective municipalities and years 
of e.g. Green Party membership. Interpretations of models with control variables are more 
straightforward to interpret, where the relationship between the outcome and the variable of 
                                                 
4
 Notably, including municipality fixed effects in any model with municipality type controls is not possible due 
to collinearity. 
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interest is estimated, holding values of the control variables constant. These latter estimates 
are, as discussed in the methodology section, attempts at reaching causal estimates of the 
effects of interest. To put it in other terms, with these models I attempt to achieve ceteris 
paribus – other (relevant) things equal – which, if valid, gives unbiased estimates. The extent 
of achievement of this is not as clear-cut as in experimental or quasi-experimental settings, 
and there can naturally be an argument made against causal interpretation of these estimates. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, these estimations remain highly interesting 
regardless – in this sample, they show the relationship between outcomes and variables of 
interest, holding the aspects controlled for constant. 
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4. Results 
The main results for this thesis are shown in tables 3-6. Before going into interpretation of 
these results, I will show graphical representations of two particular relationships, which I 
think are highly illustrative. 
4.1 Graphical Representation 
 
Firstly, figure 6 shows the relationship between municipal party support for the whole 
preceding term (4 years) and electoral participation in municipal elections, for the period of 
2002-2014. What can be seen here is a quite evident negative relationship, where the line 
fitted to the scatterplot is equivalent to the coefficient in table 3, model 1. This is the “crude” 
relationship between public funding of parties in the four years preceding an election and 
turnout in that municipal election, and it is clearly so that higher levels of municipal party 
funding are associated with lower levels of turnout. The argument is similar if one considers 
only support in the same year as explanatory variable, as can be seen in table 4, model 1, 
where the estimate is virtually equivalent (at roughly 4 times the magnitude). 
Figure 6. The relationship between municipal party support and turnout, 2002-2014. 
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Turning to figure 7, this shows the relationship between municipal party support for the 
whole preceding term and electoral participation in municipal elections when both these 
variables have been “de-meaned” with respect to both municipality and year indicators5, i.e. 
both time and unit fixed effects have been applied. The line fitted to the scatterplot 
corresponds to the estimate from table 3, model 4, showing a marginally negative coefficient, 
which is far from statistically different from zero, which can also be seen from the line in 
figure 7 being virtually flat. Interpretation of this estimate, and estimates from other models, 
follows in the next section. 
                                                 
5
 Technically, I simply regressed these variables separately on vectors of municipality and time dummies and 
saved the residuals. 
Figure 7. The relationship between municipal party support and turnout, with time and 
unit fixed effects applied. 
  
 
Table 3. Estimates of the effect of full-term support on electoral turnout. 
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Full-term public funding -0.00854** 0.00930* -0.00971** -0.000783 -0.00630*** -0.00837** -0.00311 0.00104 
 (0.00412) (0.00550) (0.00407) (0.00158) (0.00217) (0.00341) (0.00190) (0.00164) 
Constant 81.76*** 76.17*** 79.39*** 75.06*** 115.6*** 60.10*** 111.1*** 83.93*** 
 (0.595) (0.756) (0.574) (0.220) (13.40) (1.499) (11.46) (11.18) 
         
Mun. controls NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Demographic controls NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Mun. FE NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared 0.026 0.705 0.287 0.956 0.537 0.485 0.689 0.771 
Table 3. Estimates from regressions using municipal funding during the preceding term as explanatory variable, 2002-2014. The dependent variable for all 
models is turnout in municipal elections, measured in percentage points (% * 100). Estimates from controls are not reported to facilitate readability. 
Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered on the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4. Estimates of the effect of same-year support on electoral turnout. 
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Same-year public funding -0.0347** 0.0114 -0.0369** 0.00275 -0.0228*** -0.0310** -0.0106 0.00455 
 (0.0152) (0.00844) (0.0147) (0.00382) (0.00759) (0.0123) (0.00649) (0.00548) 
Constant 81.55*** 76.68*** 80.60*** 75.99*** 115.0*** 65.96*** 110.7*** 83.63*** 
 (0.556) (0.281) (0.543) (0.147) (13.31) (0.816) (11.44) (11.19) 
         
Mun. controls NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Demographic controls NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Mun. FE NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Observations 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,157 1,443 1,157 1,157 
R-squared 0.034 0.709 0.275 0.943 0.537 0.398 0.689 0.771 
Table 4. Estimates from regressions using municipal funding during the same year as explanatory variable, 1998-2014. The dependent variable for all models 
is turnout in municipal elections, measured in percentage points (% * 100). Estimates from controls are not reported to facilitate readability. Standard errors 
in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered on the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 5. Estimates of the effect of full-term support on membership in the Green Party. 
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Full-term public funding -0.00398 0.00620 -0.00581 -0.00952 -0.00757 -0.00511 -0.00598 0.00277 
 (0.00552) (0.0153) (0.00555) (0.00761) (0.00538) (0.00530) (0.00507) (0.00487) 
Constant 13.88*** 10.65*** 10.90*** 9.529*** 56.06 0.779 30.44 -35.84 
 (0.840) (2.107) (0.852) (1.063) (34.33) (3.200) (36.62) (39.18) 
         
Mun. controls NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Demographic controls NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Mun. FE NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Observations 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 
R-squared 0.001 0.617 0.143 0.760 0.095 0.120 0.162 0.255 
Table 5. Estimates from regressions using municipal funding during the preceding term as explanatory variable, 2001-2014. The dependent variable for all 
models is membership in the Green Party in an election year, measured as members per 10 000 inhabitants. Estimates from controls are not reported to 
facilitate readability. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered on the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6. Estimates of the effect of same-year support on membership in the Green Party. 
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Same-year public funding -0.0183 -0.00168 -0.0214 -0.0164 -0.0211 -0.0174 -0.0194 0.0126 
 (0.0165) (0.0209) (0.0165) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0180) (0.0171) (0.0165) 
Constant 11.95*** 10.47*** 9.707*** 8.616*** 38.42 1.021 30.68 -35.78 
 (0.677) (0.742) (0.704) (0.540) (35.04) (3.198) (36.56) (39.20) 
         
Mun. controls NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Demographic controls NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Mun. FE NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Observations 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,015 1,147 1,147 1,147 
R-squared 0.003 0.627 0.129 0.756 0.062 0.120 0.161 0.254 
Table 6. Estimates from regressions using municipal funding during the same year as explanatory variable, 2001-2014. The dependent variable for all models 
is membership in the Green Party, measured as members per 10,000 inhabitants. Estimates from controls are not reported to facilitate readability. Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered on the municipal level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2 Interpretation 
I will turn first to the principal results of this study, concerning electoral turnout in municipal 
elections as the outcome variable, i.e. the results in tables 3 and 4. Firstly, as described above, 
crude estimates from model 1 in both tables are negative, statistically significant and 
practically equal, considering that the measurement of the independent variable in table 3 is 
simply four separate years of funding added together. This means that there is a negative 
association between municipal party funding and turnout in municipal elections at face value 
– without specifying reasons for it, municipalities with higher party support have lower 
turnout in their elections: To make sense of this, an increase in same-year funding of about 
one standard deviation (25 kr/inhabitant) is associated with a reduction in turnout of about 0.9 
percentage points, which is not an economically insignificant number in this context. Turning 
to models with municipality fixed effects, they show estimates that are marginally positive or 
zero, both with and without time fixed effects added (models 2 and 4 respectively). An 
interesting result is the statistical significance (at the 10 % level) of the positive estimate in 
table 3, model 2, which could be interpreted as higher full-term support than on average in a 
given municipality being associated with higher electoral turnout than on average in that 
municipality. However, one should probably not emphasize this result too much, since it is 
only marginally statistically significant and not robust to slight model changes. Adding time 
fixed effects to the bivariate model, as in model 3, does not change conclusions significantly. 
Controlling for unit-invariant effects makes sense in this setting, since it is likely that single-
election, national, trends (such as lower turnout in the 2002 election) will affect most 
municipalities more or less uniformly, incurring imprecision but not necessarily bias if not 
controlled for. Turning to models 5-8, where control variables are introduced, it is clear that 
the further one gets from the bivariate model, the closer estimates get to zero – introducing 
only demographic or municipal type controls results in statistically significant negative 
estimates across both measurements of party support, while both models with the full set of 
control variables renders estimates that are not statistically separable from zero. 
When it comes to the results regarding membership in the Green Party, presented in tables 5 
and 6, the first striking pattern is that no single coefficient is statistically significant. One 
reason why this might be the case is that this study could simply be statistically 
underpowered when it comes to discerning this relationship – membership in the Green Party 
might be responsive to changes in municipal support, but not enough so to be noticed in a 
sample of this size. On the other hand, it could clearly be the case that membership in the 
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Green Party in fact isn’t affected by municipal party funding. However, if one counts signs – 
keeping in mind that this doesn’t say anything about the results statistically – 13 out of 16 
estimates are negative. Again, results from model 1 in both tables are more or less equivalent, 
and interpreting the relationship in table 6, model 1, an increase in municipal support to 
parties with about one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in Green Party 
members per 10 000 inhabitants by about 0.5. While this effect is clearly marginal (and not 
statistically significant), it could be seen as a relatively substantial one, given that the mean 
value of Green Party membership is 11.27 members per 10 000 inhabitants. 
4.3 Conclusion 
To sum up the results of this thesis, the relationship between municipal party support and 
political participation seems to be negative or non-existent. In this context, however, a “non-
result” is also a result – considering e.g. that the models with both time and municipal fixed 
effects rendered estimates close to zero for turnout, a conclusion is that higher municipal 
support to parties than on average with respect to a given municipality and a given year, is 
not associated with either higher or lower turnout than on average with respect to a given 
municipality and a given year in this sample. When it comes to the results using turnout as 
dependent variable, it seems that there is a real negative relationship when it comes to simpler 
model specifications. This relationship is presumably not interpretable as a causal one, 
however, since it disappears conditional on characteristics that could be expected to 
determine selection, biasing estimates from underspecified models. Regarding the results 
concerning membership in the Green Party, they are as stated before secondary to the purpose 
of this thesis, and have to be seen as highly tentative when it comes to external validity 
especially. However, in this sample, it is clear that the relationship between municipal party 
support and membership in the Green Party is again best described as non-positive, but in this 
case, in statistical terms, not distinguishable from zero. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The development of public provisions of funding for political parties is arguably one of those 
with most far-reaching implications for political systems that have occurred in recent times. 
In virtually all European democracies, public party support has been introduced in one form 
or another, and Sweden is no exception to this rule (SOU, 2012:30). Rather, party funding 
comes in great sums both at the national level from 1965 and at the municipal level from 
1969. Still, many aspects of public party support remain understudied, especially with a 
comparative approach, since the cross-country data is all but incommensurable, and cross-
municipal studies remain very few, even if data is remarkably more complete (cf. Svaleryd & 
Vlachos, 2009). Thus, I have tried to make a contribution on the margin to this area of 
research by studying the effect of municipal party support on two different aspects of political 
participation in Sweden – turnout in municipal elections, and membership in the Green Party. 
While results for the second outcome in particular have to be seen as highly tentative, a 
pattern emerges for both measures of political participation, in particular regarding electoral 
turnout – the provision of public funds does at least not have a positive effect on local 
democracy, as is intended, measured in these two forms of political participation. However, 
concluding that municipal party support has a negative causal effect on turnout in municipal 
elections is presumably to go one bridge too far. Rather, when one controls for aspects that 
are likely to determine selection into different levels of public funding of municipal party 
support and electoral turnout, this relationship is statistically inseparable from zero. 
I will end this thesis, as is so often done, with a call for more research on the topic studied. 
Political participation, which the outcomes studied here are broadly conceptualized as, is only 
one area of many where one could expect that increased public funding of parties has far-
reaching implications. The utilization of the richness of data on Swedish municipalities is one 
rather straightforward way of studying political finance comparatively, within a certain 
political system. However, one venue of further research that suggests itself is to study 
political finance comparatively, across countries, in a more thorough way. What is most 
strikingly lacking for that to be possible is the absence of good, reliable comparative data, 
which requires a considerable effort to collect. Given that economists and political scientists 
have studied topics relating to political power in democracies to such great extent; it simply 
seems like a waste of knowledge not to incorporate this aspect further into new research 
projects.  
Oskar Hultin Bäckersten  Master Essay I 
 32 
References 
Bibliography 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's 
companion. Princeton university press. 
Barnow, B., Cain, G., & Goldberger, A. (1981). Selection on observables. Evaluation Studies 
Review Annual, 5(1), 43-59. 
van Deth, J. (2016). What is Political Participation?. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Politics. Accessed 2017-10-06 at 
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-68.  
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. Journal of 
Political Economy, 65(2), 135-150. 
Duverger, M. (2014). Political Party in Encyclopaedia Britannica.  
Accessed 2017-10-05 at https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-party 
Fisher, J., & Eisenstadt, T. A. (2004). Introduction: Comparative Party Finance: What is to be 
Done? Party Politics, 10(6), 619-626. 
Hagevi, M. (2014). Fyra decenniers partistöd. Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 116(1). 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57. 
Hultin Bäckersten, O. (2016). Is the First Time Special? : The Effect of Past Eligibility on 
Turnout in the Swedish Election to the European Parliament 2009. (MSc thesis). Accessed 
2017-10-05 at http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-296407 
International IDEA. (2012). Political Finance Database. Accessed 2017-10-06 at 
https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database 
International IDEA. (2014). Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A 
Handbook on Political Finance. 
Accessed 2017-10-05 at https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/funding-of-
political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pdf 
Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1992). Party Organizations: A Data Handbook. 
Oskar Hultin Bäckersten  Master Essay I 
 33 
Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy: 
the emergence of the cartel party. Party politics, 1(1), 5-28. 
Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2009). The cartel party thesis: A restatement. Perspectives on 
politics, 7(4), 753-766. 
Lindbeck, A., & Snower, D. J. (1984). Involuntary Employment as an Insider-Outsider 
Dilemma. IIES. 
Ohman, M. (2011, February). Global trends in the regulation of political finance. 
In Conferência IPSA-ECPR ―Whatever Happened to North-South. Accessed 2017-10-05 at 
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_26172.pdf 
Pierre, J., Svåsand, L., & Widfeldt, A. (2000). State subsidies to political parties: Confronting 
rhetoric with reality. West European Politics, 23(3), 1-24. 
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2002). Financing politics: A global view. Journal of Democracy, 
13(4), 69-86. 
Proposition 1991/92:66. Kommunalt partistöd. 
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and 
nonrandomized studies. Journal of educational Psychology, 66(5), 688. 
Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party government. Transaction Publishers. 
Sekhon, J.(2008-08-21). The Neyman— Rubin Model of Causal Inference and Estimation Via 
Matching Methods in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Accessed 2017-10-05 
at 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286546.001.0001/oxford
hb-9780199286546-e-11.  
SFS 1969:596. Lag om kommunalt partistöd. 
SFS 1991:900. Kommunallag. 
SOU 2012:30. Vital kommunal demokrati.  
SOU 1991:80. Kommunalt partistöd. 
Scarrow, S. E. (2007). Political finance in comparative perspective. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 10, 
193-210. 
Oskar Hultin Bäckersten  Master Essay I 
 34 
Svaleryd, H., & Vlachos, J. (2009). Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy. Journal of 
Public Economics, 93(3), 355-372. 
TT. (2009). Användning av partistöd ifrågasätts. Norran. 1 February 2009. 
Accessed 2017-10-05 at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090204173037/http:/norran.se/nyheter/norrochvasterbotten/art
icle240326.ece 
Van Biezen, I., & Kopecký, P. (2007). The state and the parties: public funding, public 
regulation and rent-seeking in contemporary democracies. Party politics, 13(2), 235-254. 
Öhrvall, R. (2012). Svenskt valdeltagande under hundra år. SCB. Accessed 2017-10-06 at 
http://www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/me0105_2010a01_br_me09br1203.pdf 
Statistical sources 
Miljöpartiet (2017). Medlemsstatistik. Retrieved in communications with Magnus Haglund, 
officer at the Green Party. 
SCB (2017). Statistikdatabasen.  
Codes: ME0104B (Turnout), BE0101N1 (Population, Demographics), 000001NR (Share 
foreign born), AM0207A2/AM0207F2 (Working). 
SKL (2011). Kommungruppsindelning 2011. 
SKL (2017a). Kommun- och landstingsdatabasen (Kolada).  
Codes: N01982/N01984 (Education), N05007 (Public funding), N00903 (Taxpaying power). 
SKL (2017b). Maktfördelning för tidsperioden 1994-2014. Accessed 2017-10-05 at 
https://skl.se/demokratiledningstyrning/valmaktfordelning/valresultatmaktfordelning2014/val
resultatochmaktfordelningsammanstallning19942014.370.html 
 
